

PRESERVING VICTORY:

The American Civil War, The United States Army, and the Ku Klux Klan

A Monograph
By
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Infantry



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ABSTRACT

PRESERVING VICTORY: The American Civil War, The US Army, and the Ku Klux Klan, by MAJ Lewis C. Cochran, USA, 52 pages.

This monograph examines the insurgency conducted by the Southern States during the last part of the American Civil War and the early period of Reconstruction, specifically from the time period of Sherman's march to March 1867. The paper proposes that the development of the Southern insurgency is a good example of future insurgencies and that lessons can be derived from this time period that will provide a partial basis for future counterinsurgency doctrine.

This monograph contains six sections: introduction, insurgency theory, US military insurgency/counterinsurgency doctrine, a description of the Southern insurgency, analysis, and conclusion. The theory section primarily examines the works of Crane Brinton and Eric Hoffer to provide a basis for examining US doctrine and the Southern insurgency. These works are particularly relevant since they were written before the US Army focused on Mao's "people's war" insurgencies. The section on US Forces doctrine surveys material from the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual to the present rewrite of FM 100-20, Security and Stability Operations (the reported new title). The doctrine section concludes that the present doctrine has begun to shift focus from Mao's "people's war" to more likely types and forms of insurgencies. Still more work is needed, and the US Army experience during the Civil War and Reconstruction is a good example to provide points of departure. Next the Southern insurgency is examined to provide material for analysis. The analysis section provides lessons from the period of the Civil War and Reconstruction that can be included in future doctrine. The conclusion provides a synthesis of the points made concerning insurgency development theory, US doctrine, and the lessons learned from the time period examined.

The monograph concludes that there are many different types and forms of insurgency. It offers a common definition and framework to understand the types of insurgencies. However, the main conclusion is that more work is still needed to develop appropriate doctrine to complete our understanding of the forms of insurgency and their complex nature. The examination of the American Civil War and Reconstruction is only an example, although a good one, of this phenomena that may help commanders and soldiers in understanding the complexity of combating insurgencies of the future.

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Introduction

Man does not enter battle to fight, but for victory. He does everything that he can to avoid the first and obtain the second.
Colonel Ardant du Picq¹

On Christmas Day 1864, while languishing in an enemy prisoner of war camp, Corporal John David Cay wrote in his diary,

Merry Christmas to you all who are free and able to enjoy it. For we tis anything but merry but I look forward through the mist of the present for the coming of a glorious day, as confidently as I believe the sun will rise on the morrow. Our Cause is a just one. I've lean on the arm of an all powerful and just God and will he permit our enemies continually to triumph plunder and destroy. No I cannot, will not believe it. And grant it may not be.²

On 6 January 1865 Corporal Cay and his fellow prisoners were moved to Hilton Head Island and confined in cages open to the elements. He wrote:

Still exposed to the cold winds which broken by neither tree or hedge purs in upon us from almost every quarter. One other poor Reb(original underline) died last night, three in 36 hours. Pretty good for Yankey kindness, they are yet unsatisfied, enough have not yet paid the penalty incurred by what is here called the inhuman treatment received at our hands by Yankey prisoners, for this we are being retaliated upon. Oh for strength, both of body and mind to endure whatever may be considered necessary to cancel the exaggerated sufferings of prisoners in our hands. I know I shall endure, at least the mind will, the body may succumb but the soul never (original underline). No never shall I break my solemn vows to my country. Never shall it be said that I a son of the South was unfaithful to her cause.³

Eventually Corporal Cay was transported to the US Army prisoner of war camp at Point Lookout, Delaware. Sometime that spring he was released, transported to Richmond, and walked to his home in Liberty County, Georgia, 30 miles south of Savannah. Upon arriving at his home he found the countryside had been left barren by Sherman's soldiers. His family home and all their possessions had been burned, destroyed or stolen. Shortly thereafter he married and moved to the budding town of Tallahassee, Florida. There are no records to indicate whether or not he participated in the insurrection in the South that followed the end of the Civil War.⁴ The words expressed in his diary would indicate that

given even a mild justification he would likely participate in insurgent activity. To prevent Corporal Cay from participating in a post conflict insurgency, the United States Government would need to develop a carefully planned and executed counterinsurgency campaign.

Militarily the Union unquestionably defeated the Confederacy during the American Civil War. As General Lee bade farewell to the former Army of Northern Virginia, he implored the soldiers to return to their homes and become good citizens. General Longstreet publicly argued in 1868 that the people of the South should accept defeat and acknowledge the military and political rule of the United States Government.⁵ Historians who have examined the attitudes of Southern soldiers following the military defeat of the Confederacy admit that the majority seemed ready to accept the Union victory. All these elements pointed to a peaceful transition to a united country. Given these circumstances, why was it that by 1868 many Southern states were fully embroiled in an insurgency against Union political and military rule? Perhaps the circumstances of Corporal Cay suggest some strategies to preclude the formation of insurgencies. For instance: prevention of destruction of civilian property by soldiers, providing for the orderly repatriation of Prisoners of War following the end of hostilities, and the general rebuilding of society following the end of hostilities. These are only a few possibilities and certainly they are not all inclusive. Clearly, the prevention of an insurgency is much easier than combating one that is already formed. After an insurgency is underway it must be combated by the full use of diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) instruments of power.

The Civil War ended 131 years ago, but since that time the US Army has continually found itself in the position of being an occupying force in hostile lands. The most recent edition of FM 100-5 acknowledges that the Army will most likely have the “de facto lead” in Operations Other Than War (OOTW), including post-conflict and counterinsurgency operations.⁶ If the Army could not prevent an insurgency among its

own population following the Civil War, what are the chances it could have prevented one in Somalia, or can prevent one in Haiti, Bosnia or any other future operational areas?

The doctrine for OOTW, and specifically the doctrine for post-conflict and counterinsurgency operations, are still their infancy. However, the US Army will undoubtedly continue to find itself involved in these situations. Many scholars believe that insurgencies will be the dominant category of conflict in the foreseeable future until some new threat emerges to challenge the Western democracies. Even during the Cold War, United States foreign policy frequently resulted in the Army becoming involved in OOTW. It is therefore probable, perhaps even inevitable, that the United States Army will continue to be involved in combating insurgencies. By examining the US Army's earlier experience with the development of an insurgency (post-conflict Civil War) current OOTW doctrine can be evaluated and modified (if necessary) to help prepare the leadership and soldiers for such a contingency.

Scholars acknowledge that the Southern states had, and probably still have, a distinct culture based on a different economic, social and political outlook compared with the other parts of the United States.⁷ As the Army becomes involved in other parts of the world, the problems posed for it by cultural differences will be greatly magnified. While each situation has special characteristics, some of these situations may yield lessons with universal applicability. By examining our own Civil War and its aftermath, the period known as Reconstruction, some universally applicable lessons may be derived that can be included in the evolving doctrine of OOTW.

This paper will first examine the theoretical basis for the rise of insurgencies. This examination will provide a common understanding of circumstances that may give rise to an insurgency. It will also give a basis for understanding the specific circumstances that precipitated the insurgency in the Southern states after the Civil War. The end of the Cold War may have initiated new types and forms of insurgencies. For the purpose of this paper insurgency types are generally: revolutionary, guerrilla, terrorism, organized criminals, and

violent political groups. Insurgency forms are: political, religious, ethnic, racial, cultural and criminal. During the Cold War insurgencies' main goal was the complete destruction and overthrow of existing regimes. Frequently these insurgencies were sponsored by the United States, the former Soviet Union, or client of these two states. These insurgencies represented an adjunct to the Cold War struggle. This form of insurgency was characterized by Mao's "people's war". Many scholars believe that insurgencies based on the above listed forms will provide the basis of future insurgencies. Another significant difference in the characteristics of future insurgencies will be that quite often they will not seek the overthrow of the old political system, but simply autonomous existence or even shared existence. The most complicating factor with future insurgencies is they will mix type and form in many combinations - every insurgency will be different. The insurgency in the Southern states following the end of the Civil War followed this checkerboard pattern; combining guerrilla, terrorism, criminal and political type insurgencies; and the political, religious, ethnic, racial, cultural and criminal forms. What is old is new again.

Next this paper will examine current OOTW and counterinsurgency doctrine. This examination will determine if the doctrine is based on sound theoretical principles. It will also provide a basis to determine possible gaps in US Army and Joint counterinsurgency doctrine. Together, insurgency theory and current doctrine for OOTW will provide the basis for examining how the Army's role, functions and actions during and after the Civil War may have impacted, both positively and negatively, on the development of that insurgency. The US doctrine developed during the Vietnam war was sound. It was used in Korea, El Salvador, and Afghanistan with favorable results from the mid-60s to the mid-80s. These insurgencies, however, were of the Mao's "people's war" variety. US Army doctrine must develop strategies to deal with new types and forms of insurgencies.

Finally, an examination of the Army's involvement in post-conflict operations in the occupied areas of the South before and during the early phases of Reconstruction will facilitate the evaluation of theory and doctrine. This history will reveal both how the US

Army unwittingly promoted the rise of the Southern insurgency as well as discouraged it. By examining each in detail, practical lessons can be derived that can be included in the evolving doctrine for OOTW.

The Vietnam War is often cited as the best example of how not to conduct an counterinsurgency campaign, but after our own Civil War the US Army also faced an important counterinsurgency campaign. More importantly, it is one that can be better understood because it involved the American people. In sum, the objective of this monograph is the derivation of universally applicable lessons that can be included in OOTW doctrine and which can be easily understood and applied by Army leaders and soldiers.

Insurgency Development Theory

As for his subjects, when there is no external attack, the prince must worry about hidden conspiracies, against which he will find security by avoiding hatred and contempt and by keeping the people satisfied.

The Prince. . . Machiavelli, 1513.⁸

The explanation of how an insurgency develops is clouded in an almost impenetrable haze. Many scholars have tried to explain why societies display various degrees of opposition to existing governments, but almost all admit they believe they only have a relative understanding of the problem, and the ideas they have derived from these studies can be applied only in the general sense. To truly understand insurgency it must be studied in its singular form only. Military theorists and historians John Shy and Thomas Collier wrote in 1986,

To abstract from this phenomenon some more limited and technical, more intellectual and less emotional, "strategy" of "revolutionary warfare" may be to miss the most important part of the subject--the specific social, political, and psychological conditions that make a revolution possible. Without those conditions, strategic technique is meaningless; and any strategy of revolution that does not reflect and exploit them as they exist, in a specific time and place will almost certainly fail.⁹

Many reasons account for this difficulty: time, degree of discontent, effectiveness of the government, societal peculiarities (history, language, religion, culture), economy, and the governmental system, to name only a few. In fact, the reasons insurgencies develop are often so complex they defy explanation. Like the most noted theorists on insurgencies, this section will attempt to explain the most common attributes, and several lesser attributes, that were applicable to our own Civil War insurgency in the belief that it is a more common example of future insurgencies. This analysis will allow an understanding of attributes that can be examined in future situations. But first it is necessary to examine the most recent common form of insurgency, Mao's "people's war", and explain why this form will probably not be as common in the future.

The world was dominated until 1989 by the bi-polar Cold War. Insurgencies during this period were often associated with this struggle because it was the most readily available means for the United States and the former Soviet Union to indirectly confront one another. This form of struggle was most often manifested in the sponsorship of competing sides in a particular region or country. In the early days of the Cold War this was most evident in the bipolarization of the world along ideological grounds. Nations, states, and people of every description were forced to choose sides; there was very little middle ground. J.F.C. Fuller explained in 1956:

Does this mean that war is approaching its end? Assuredly no, because in an ideological age the fundamental causes of war are profoundly psychological; they cannot be eliminated either by a negotiation, or a surplus, of physical force. All it means is that one form of war has become obsolete, and that another will replace it. For lack of a better name, the new form in the age of man in the mass is called "cold war." It is a combination of psychological war, the weapons of which are emotions; of economic war aimed at destroying financial stability; of guerrilla war, the most primitive form of war; and civil war, its most brutal form.¹⁰

Fuller adds that while the means are limited the stakes are not. He continued by defining the players.

Russia is the leading exponent of this form of conflict, and by waging it in methodical lines, immediately after the shooting war ended she established

her domination over a third of Europe without firing a shot, since when she has waged it by propaganda, sabotage and subversion in every non-Communist country in the world; for all countries which have not accepted Soviet Communism are held to be active enemies of Russia. These limitations have led to the strategical division of the world between two super-States, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, each possessed of an ideology which neither will abandon.¹¹

It now appears this view was profoundly true but still not accurate. The bi-polar world over time proved to be more complex, and both east and west leaders were slow to realize the full implications. President Truman declared support to the Greek government against its "communist insurgency". The "communist insurgency" was in fact a long standing ethnic conflict. The communists victory in China, lead by Mao Tse-tung, was a Soviet sponsored ideological revolution. Mao, in fact, believed in a much different form of communist state than that in the Soviet union. North Korean communists were supplied by the Soviets and protected by the communist Chinese. In fact the Soviets did not know about the initial North Korean attack, and the Chinese had legitimate concerns as to the intentions of the United Nations Forces when they later attacked into North Korea. Many of the east/west - communist/democracy characterized insurgencies until 1989 had long standing historical roots with no relation to this ideological struggle. This does not mean that the ideological confrontation was not a reality (it was), but only a recent and now largely vanished phenomena; one that is certainly no longer the prevalent form of insurgency.

There is another reason why Mao's "people's war" can not be universalized. To create a universal model of insurgency is to disregard the principle of coevolution. Everything in nature operates on this principle of coevolution. Dr. M. Mitchell Waldrop in the book Complexity describes it as "a kind of Darwinian principle of relativity: everyone is constantly adapting to everyone else."¹² As western democracies have come to understand Mao's form of insurgency and adjusted, so have potential insurgencies. Ho Chi Minh combined Mao's concepts and the early experiences (1930's) of the Viet Minh and transformed them into *Dau tranh*. Still later (1960's) General Vo Nguyen Giap

combined these concepts with the most recent experiences and further transformed *Dau tranh* into a war-winning strategy.¹³ The principle of coevolution will always make insurgencies unique.

Shy and Collier, quoted earlier concerning the unique nature of all insurgencies, make the same mistake that has been repeated consistently over the last 40 years. They profess the uniqueness of insurgencies, but state the foundation of all of them was Mao's "people's war." "Revolutionary warfare, as a fully developed concept, is a relatively recent phenomenon largely because it is so closely associated with two aspects of modernity-- industrialization and imperialism. Marxists and other radical critics of the modern industrial, economic, and social order were among the first to analyze the problem of mobilizing and employing armed force to defeat the police and army of the capitalist and ruling classes."¹⁴ To believe this is to dismiss the special characteristics of every insurgency, successful or not, both before and after the Cold War. Dr. Steven Metz offers a new view that Mao's "people's war" was simply the dominant form during the Cold War; with that yoke lifted many forms of insurgencies will again dot the world landscape. Dr. Metz offers a new framework, "to transcend the conceptual limits of the Cold War, insurgency should be considered as simply protracted, organized violence--whether revolutionary or nonrevolutionary, political or nonpolitical, and open or clandestine--which threatens security and requires a government response."¹⁵ This framework allows the inclusion of all types and forms of insurgencies. Mao's "people's war" form insurgency may well occur again, but the multitude of other types and/or forms of insurgencies are no less likely and must also be examined and understood. As Dr. Metz aptly writes:

In the post-Cold War period, our involvement in counterinsurgency may grow out of peace operations, but it will still be inadvertent more often than not. The Clinton Administration's national security strategy does not specifically mention counterinsurgency other than "nation assistance" in Latin America, but its emphasis on global engagement, expanding democracy, and supporting peace operations opens the way for inadvertent involvement.¹⁶

The lessons are clear: insurgencies come in all flavors (no one type or form is preeminent), and each insurgency must be evaluated based on the circumstances of that particular insurgency. Nevertheless, some common characteristics can be pinpointed that help to explain the causes of insurgencies.

As previously stated, because of the proclivity of writers during the Cold War to focus on Mao's "people's war" it is advantageous to examine the theory and history of insurgencies before this period. Eric Hoffer's The True Believer (1938, 1952, 1965) and Crane Brinton's The Anatomy of Revolution (1951) are two particularly good and relevant works because they were written *before* the full development of the Cold War. Crane Brinton likens the rise of an insurgency to that of a fever in the human body. This analogy is useful and will be examined so the reader can begin to gage the relative progression of an insurgency. Eric Hoffer takes a more psychoanalytical view, describing in some detail the attitudes and functions of the participants in insurgencies. Together they will allow a basic description of "why" and perhaps "how" (the best that can be hoped for) in understanding the theory of insurgency development.

The basis for Crane Brinton's fever analogy is the human body in equilibrium and the progression of a disease. He describes the analogy as follows:

In the society during the generation or so before the outbreak of revolution, in the old regime, there will be found signs of the coming disturbance. Rigorously, these signs are not symptoms, since when the symptoms are fully developed the disease is already present. They are perhaps better described as *prodromal* signs, indications to the very keen diagnostician that a disease is on the way, but not yet sufficiently developed to be the disease. Then comes a time when the full symptoms disclose themselves, and when we can say the fever of revolution has begun. This works up, not regularly but with advances and retreats, to a crisis, frequently accompanied by delirium, the rule of the most violent revolutionists, the Reign of Terror. After the crisis comes a period of convalescence, usually marked by a relapse or two. Finally the fever is over, and the patient is himself again, perhaps in some respects actually strengthened by the experience, immunized at least for a while from a similar attack, but certainly not wholly made over into a new man.¹⁷

Brinton uses this analogy to help analyze four case studies: The English, American, French, and Russian Revolutions. However, all of these examples are of insurgencies that

run the complete cycle. What of insurgencies that only cause limited change but are still successful? At the risk of trying to explain too much using Brinton's analogy, insurgencies with more limited goals are possible. As a result, it might be said that the body shows only slight signs of an illness, but this illness can be just as devastating over time. An example of this type disease might be a venereal disease. Periodically the body feels discomfort and a mild fever, but over time the body is destroyed and dies. This is not revolutionary war, but it is still insurgency. The American Civil War and Reconstruction are also good examples of a long term illness; states rights and federal control are still issues facing our country today and the status of Black Americans in our society still tears at it's heart.

Brinton starts his classic analysis with "the diagnosis of preliminary signs."¹⁸ In the old regime the government was plagued by "unusually serious economic, or at least financial difficulties of a special kind."¹⁹ Specifically, while the government was near collapse financially the society was generally performing well, at least in relation to the government. The economy was providing for the welfare of the people, with no "unusually widespread economic want."²⁰ The problem centered on what the people wanted and what they felt they were getting. Of note is that at this point the difference centered on the "middle class", the impoverished of the nation seemed unaffected. Brinton summarized with "we see that certain economic grievances--usually not in the form of economic distress, but rather a feeling on the part of some of the chief enterprising groups that their opportunities for getting on in this world are unduly limited by political arrangements."²¹ These conditions manifested themselves in "protests against taxation."²² The characteristic that appears at this point is that government tries to reform itself.²³ He also submits that each of the existing governments in his study had capable military organizations, but used them to late and ineffectively to preclude the outbreak of full scale revolution.²⁴ This would appear to be a standard reaction by any government, but as Brinton keenly observes, this attempt at reform actually sparks the coming insurgency.

“Pressure groups” are the first to form insurgencies against the government. “Pressure groups” refer to existing organizations that have a special interest in society. These exist in any society - so their mere presence is not the determining factor. At some point they take active, perhaps even violent, opposition to the government. A concurrent phenomena is the transference of allegiance from the government to opposition groups by the “intellectuals.” Brinton admits he is not sure if this transfer of allegiance is a cause or result of revolutionary conditions. In any case its mere presence is an indicator that the insurgency has begun.²⁵ The final characteristic that Brinton notes is that at some point elements of the ruling class start believing that “their privileges are unjust or harmful to society.”²⁶ Brinton notes that some of these characteristics are evident in all societies, but in one primed for insurgency they “existed in some unusual combination and intensities.”²⁷ Finally, Brinton observes that an actual event always seems to signal the start of the violent phase of an insurgency: the American Revolution was the Battle of Concord; the French Revolution the storming of the Bastille; the Russian Revolution the Petrograd riots; and the English Revolution the revolt of the Long Parliament.²⁸ The revolt against Reconstruction in the South had similar defining events. Brinton goes on to describe these revolutions to their end, but that is not necessary here because we are only concerned in this paper with that time period that leads up to the insurgency. Eric Hoffer offers a different, but equally valuable, evaluation of the roots of an insurgency.

Hoffer believes that the masses, once converted, are the impetus behind revolutions. To bring the masses to fight, many different kinds of people encourage them. The underlying premise is that in order to mobilize the disaffected in the population many factors have to be present in society. Hoffer first generally identifies the group of people who start the “mass movement.” His conclusion is similar to Brinton’s: generally the middle class wants more; or, as he puts it, are not satisfied with what they have and have hope for a better future feeling “they are in possession of some irresistible power.”²⁹

“There is perhaps no more reliable indicator of a society’s ripeness for a mass movement than the prevalence of unrelieved boredom.”³⁰ Two particular groups that may apply in the Civil War are women and former soldiers. Particularly after long and devastating wars these two groups are lost. Women, although they have not felt the full impact of war, suffer because they are frequently left spinsters.

Marriage has for women many equivalents of joining a mass movement. It offers them a new purpose in life, a new future and a new identity (a new name). The boredom of spinsters and of women who can no longer find joy and fulfillment in marriage stems from an awareness of a barren, spoiled life. By embracing a holy cause and dedicating their energies and substance to its advancement, they find a new life full of purpose and meaning.³¹

Soldiers are also particularly vulnerable because they are used to being busy and to being constantly around other soldiers; their life has meaning and is orderly. “The returning soldiers find it difficult to recapture the rhythm of their prewar lives. The readjustment to peace and home is slow and painful.”³² Both of these groups and circumstances were particularly evident in the South following the Civil War.

The final precondition Hoffer lists is that of a doctrine. According to Hoffer “no doctrine however profound and sublime will be effective unless it is presented as the embodiment of the one and only truth. If a doctrine is not unintelligible, it has to be vague; and if neither unintelligible nor vague, it has to be unverifiable.”³³ The cry for “states rights” is vague in almost every form except when decided by the Supreme Court in individual cases. “States rights” was the war cry for the Southern states both before and after the Civil War.

Hoffer lists some ways to counter the development of a mass movement that may give some strategies to counter the development of an insurgency. His underlying premise is that mass movements are “interchangeable”.³⁴ He offers emigration and migration as alternatives to the mass movement. “The same types who swell the ranks of a rising mass movement are also likely to avail themselves of a chance to emigrate. Thus migration can serve as a substitute for a mass movement.”³⁵

The majority of the remainder of Hoffer's work is devoted to the "mass movement" once it begins and deserves serious attention because it provides some insight as to particularly interesting players. Hoffer, unlike Brinton, believes that the intellectuals of the society must switch allegiance from the existing government to the opposition *before* the mass movement can start. Such a change in allegiance is an essential prerequisite to the mass movement, as the intellectuals (he refers to them as "talkers or writers and are recognized as such by all") do the essential work of "undermining existing institutions, of familiarizing the masses with the idea of change, and of creating a receptivity to a new faith." ³⁶

Once the mass movement is ready to begin Hoffer says it still needs a spark; a "fanatic." Hoffer says the fanatic comes not from the man of words but "mostly from the ranks of the noncreative men of works." ³⁷ This "noncreative man of works" is a pseudo intellectual that is actually a man of action. So when the mass movement is about to start he is at the lead, as he feels elation in the role. Hoffer lists Marat, Robespierre, Lenin, Mussolini and Hitler as examples. ³⁸ Nathan Bedford Forrest may be the "fanatic" of the Southern insurgency and his role will be examined later.

While Hoffer provides some historical examples, these examples lend themselves to many possible interpretations and make the reader believe he is, in many cases, simply offering his biased interpretation of the truth. Unlike Hoffer, Brinton uses historical examples that are verifiable, and where not verifiable he so states. Both works are valuable, however, because they examine the rise of insurgencies before the paradigm of Mao's "people's war" became popular. Still, they serve only as generalizations for our purpose. This is an advantage; as each insurgency must be examined as a single phenomena with unique characteristics of its own.

Doctrine

A major objective of US policy is to thwart further communist inroads into non-communist areas by safeguarding and assisting the less developed nations . . . FM 31-22, 12 November 1963. ³⁹

The official doctrine for counter-insurgency for the US Army is contained in Field Manual 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, 5 December 1990. Currently, the manual is being completely rewritten with the new title being Operations Other Than War. As of March 1996 the title has been changed to Security and Stability Operations. The history of US Army counterinsurgency doctrine dates from 1955 with the publication of FM 31-21 Guerrilla Warfare, superseded in 1963 by FM 31-22 US Army Counterinsurgency Forces. While FM 31-22's principle aim was to explain the responsibilities, capabilities, and limitations of counterinsurgency forces it also laid out basic counterinsurgency doctrine. FM 31-22 was followed by FM 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict, dated 16 January 1981, which was superseded by the 5 December 1990 version. Additionally, Joint Publication 3.07.1 now contains doctrinal guidance for all services for many types of counter-insurgency operations. However, the first official doctrine available to US forces was the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, 1940. While there were other manuals available, these materials will be examined because they were widely read and professed "official" sanction as doctrine. By examining these documents a determination can be made as to the depth of understanding of insurgencies and also as to whether there exists a gap in the understanding of the full spectrum of insurgencies the US Army will likely face in the future. If there is a doctrinal shortfall, then studying the American Civil War and Reconstruction as another possible, even likely, type and form of insurgency will be beneficial to the US Army.

The Marine Corps Small Wars Manual is often credited as the first document to provide guidance on insurgency and counterinsurgency doctrine to US forces. The Small Wars Manual was written with the knowledge of 85 years of counterinsurgency experience.⁴⁰ While at times the manual is contradictory in its statements, it is clear that the writers knew their subject. Amongst the ample lessons, several principles are made adamantly clear: every small war is different; marines must study and understand the

country and its situation before a campaign plan can be written and executed; and finally that the economic, cultural, and, most of all, the political considerations always take precedence over the military ones.

Section III of the Small Wars Manual is entitled "Psychology." The authors take great pains to explain what they mean by "psychology" and its effects in small wars. First is to realize that small wars are decentralized in execution, both for the marines and the insurgents. This makes the situation unlike what marines (or soldiers) are trained to expect. Instead of massive fire power the manual stresses a Sun Tzu like dictum, "A Force Commander who gains his objective in a small war without firing a shot has attained far greater success than one who resorted to the use of arms."⁴¹ The marines understood part of this was for force protection, but stress was also maintained on the need to prevent the physical harm to the natives. Gaining the trust of the natives was key to victory. They understood that physical force may have to be applied, but its use, and certainly its indiscriminate use, would only hurt the efforts of all marines. The marines knew their very presence was a disturbing factor to the natives.

The personal pride, uniform, and bearing of the marines, their dignity, courtesy, consideration, language, and personality will have an important effect of the civilian attitude toward the forces of occupation. They should never be treated as a conquered people. There is no service which calls for greater exercise of judgment, persistency, patience, tact, and rigid military justice than in small wars, and nowhere is more of the human and sympathetic side of a military force demanded than in this type of operation. In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keystone of our relationship with the mass of the population.⁴²

The manual also devotes considerable discussion to finding the cause(s) for the insurgency. In making a determination the marines must conduct an in-depth analysis of the native people's and their customs. "Human reactions cannot be reduced to an exact science, (but) are deduced by studying the history of the people and are mastered only by experience in their practical application."⁴³ The manual lists three "fundamental considerations." First is an understanding and deference to the natives' social customs. Second is the need to understand the political affiliations, in order for the marines to act

with “strict neutrality.” Lastly, “a respect for religious custom.”⁴⁴ By observing these fundamental principles the insurgents will lose strength, while not observing them will provide the insurgents with strength.

Finally, the manual stresses that the marines are there to help the native government until it can provide for the conditions necessary to defeat the insurgency on its own. “The purpose should always be to restore normal government or give the people a better government than they had before, and to establish peace, order, and security on a permanent basis as practicable. In so doing, one should endeavor to make self-sufficient native agencies responsible for these matters.”⁴⁵ This was a hard lesson to learn; one that the US Army would violate in Vietnam but would eventually come to understand.

The Marine Corps Small Wars Manual was thus a remarkably complete compilation of how to conduct counterinsurgency warfare. It established principles, gave guidance, and provided proven tactics, techniques and procedures that had been hard learned by the US Marine Corps. Curiously, the 428 page manual was replaced by a 10 page pamphlet in 1949 and fell from use in Marine Corps schools.⁴⁶

One of the first doctrinal manuals for general use by the US Army was FM 31-21 Guerrilla Warfare, March 1955. Judging by the date alone, it can be surmised that the manual was a reflection of the Korean War experience, and the reader would not be wrong. While the manual might give an accurate evaluation of how to fight North Korean or Chinese infiltrators this doctrine would likely be disastrous against the native populations that marines had encountered in their insurgencies. In fact, FM 31-21 and the Small Wars Manual are almost diametrically opposed in philosophy.

The first lengthy point of discussion is centered on the legal status of the guerrilla in war. The occupying force has the “responsibility of making his occupation actual and effective by overcoming organized resistance and promptly suppressing guerrilla operations.”⁴⁷ Furthermore, the manual says the guerrilla is in fact a criminal, “a traitor and

is subject to punishment, including death.”⁴⁸ It is likely that if the guerrilla knew he could be put to death then he would keep fighting rather than surrender.

The manual briefly states that commanders, in developing an “antiguerrilla plan”, should conduct an analysis of the “country, national characteristics, the customs, beliefs, cares, hopes, and desires of the people.”⁴⁹ Unfortunately, the manual then quickly digresses into how to use infantry, artillery, armor and other army forces to effectively fight the guerrillas. Another method that the manual promotes as an effective antiguerrilla measure is strict population control conducted by the occupying force including:

“registering and photographing all civilians, requiring individuals to carry identification, controlling and restricting all movement, controlling all communication, controlling and rationing all foodstuffs and clothing, medical supplies, and taking hostages.”⁵⁰

Enforcement of these measures might require “just punishment” and as such could be exploited by the guerrilla forces. Just when the manual seems it is about to show some compassion for the native people it simply states: “To counter this guerrilla propaganda, every means should be used to publicize the nature of offenses for which the punishment was necessary to enforce law and order.”⁵¹ Just because the natives may understand the occupiers reasons does not make it right that an occupying force should be able to met out punishment in the first place. Ultimately, with doctrine like that contained in FM 31-21, the native population will only develop and sustain a hatred for the occupying force; probably more conducive to the development of an insurgency than to combating it.

The next doctrinal manual for general use by the US Army was FM 31-22 US Army Counterinsurgency Forces, November 1963. The genesis of the manual was two fold: the conflict between democratic states of the world and the communist states since World War II, and more significantly, as a response to the Kennedy Administration’s call to combat communists forces with US forces specifically designed to meet the challenge. While a noble effort in the right direction, within two years conventional combat forces would largely replace these forces as the main effort in Vietnam.

The Kennedy Administration took note of the Soviet Premier's speech of 6 January, 1961 in which he promised support for "wars of national liberation."⁵² By this time the superior and most prevalent form of insurgent warfare was clearly that espoused by Mao Tse-tung; a three stage effort which had been successful for the Communist Chinese. The three stages of Mao Tse-tung's strategy were "escalating from propaganda and terrorism to guerrilla war and finally erupting into climactic revolutionary war once subversion and guerrillas left the enemy fatally weakened."⁵³ Kennedy had personally read Mao's and Che Guevara's writings on revolutionary warfare. President Kennedy believed to combat communist sponsored insurgents "a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training" was necessary.⁵⁴ He directly encouraged the rapid expansion of the US Army Special Forces as the intended principle US counterinsurgency force. Kennedy believed that with Special Forces "the United States could check communist wars of national liberation, not with large commitments of American troops, but through teams of Green Berets sharing their expertise with the defenders of threatened countries."⁵⁵ Within three years however, Kennedy's initiative would be undercut by his successor, by the US military hierarchy's traditional dislike for elite forces and by the historical patterns for using force by the American military. Military historian Russell Weigley has made a convincing case in The American Way of War that the American military has a distinct predisposition, since the Civil War, to believe that overwhelming military might is the one best way to win wars. He wrote of the Vietnam era generals:

Evidently the great world wars and the American military history that had preceded them had so conditioned American military thought that their influence could not be escaped however different the circumstances of new combats might be. Clearly, President Kennedy's "whole new kind of strategy" for unconventional war had long since ceased to receive much attention beyond lip-service in the Vietnam War.⁵⁶

By the beginning of 1966, American military strength in Vietnam was 495,000; any attempt at a new strategy had been effectively abandoned. The unresolved question, however, is

what would have been the value of the new unconventional war strategy if it had been given time to work?

FM 31-22 reads like a primer for anti-communist propaganda, but still it contained the basic intellectual ingredients for combating Mao's "people's war". The manual contained phrases like, "Psychologically, few of the developing nations are aware of the insidious nature of the threat posed by communist subversion, nor do they know how to cope with the blandishments and false hopes raised by communist propaganda."⁵⁷ Fortunately for the backward "developing nations" the omniscient United States did understand these things and was willing to help them overcome this threat. Despite these pretentious phrases the writers understood the basic strategy needed to defeat this form of insurgency.

An adequate internal defense requires mobilization of national resources and their effective use through political, social, economic, military and psychological measures. Psychological operations can help to bridge the gap between the people and the government and can assist in mobilizing the human resources of the nation. The key aspect of the US role in countering subversion and insurgency in these countries is assisting these peoples to help themselves. The major effort should be from the indigenous government because the problems in each area are local and unique to that society. These existing problems must be solved primarily by the local people and their governments. US policy is to provide additional resources and capabilities to augment their own efforts in a constructive and acceptable manner in accordance with the local situation, with the credit for accomplished missions accruing in the fullest degree possible to the local government.⁵⁸

US Army doctrine began to show some finesse and realize that brute force was not always the one best solution.

The authors also understood the basic causes of insurgency and specifically the basic tenets of Mao's "people's war". The manual lists the "basic causes and motivation factors of insurgency", and then gives a half page summary of the methods and stages of Mao's "people's war". Interestingly, the manual briefly examines six recent or ongoing (at that time) insurgencies: the Indonesian revolt (1947-1949), the Huk Philippine insurgency, the Castro takeover of Cuba, the communist Chinese victory, the ongoing insurrection in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and the Algerian revolt against French colonial rule.⁵⁹

Except in the case of Algeria, all the cited cases involved communist insurgent activities to some degree. So while the authors recognized there seemed to be other forms of insurgencies besides communist based or assisted, there was never any attempt to address possible counterinsurgency doctrine to use against them. Instead, the authors only wrote doctrine for communist counterinsurgency. Fortunately, what was addressed was sound and would form the basic doctrine that would be successful in combating future insurgencies of the communist variety. FM 100-20, 1981, would build on this foundation.

After the Vietnam War, US Army doctrine writers took the time to reflect on the experience and did not issue the next anti-insurgency manual for six years. The authors seem to finally have understood the intricacies and subtle nature of insurgencies, albeit still with a distinct focus on the Mao's "people's war" variety. FM 100-20 built on the foundation of FM 31-22 in that it provided in-depth analysis of the Communist Chinese and Vietnamese form of insurgencies which it calls "mass" insurgencies. The manual even acknowledged there were other forms of insurgency, but made it clear that mass insurgencies were the most likely US forces would encounter, and also the most complex and the most difficult to defeat. The remainder of the manual describes in-depth the characteristics of the mass insurgency and how to use all aspects of power; diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME), to defeat it. During the 1980's the manual was the cornerstone for US doctrine which helped defeat insurgencies in El Salvador and aided the anti-communist insurgencies in Nicaragua and Afghanistan.

An adjunct to FM 100-20 appeared in 1987 with the Command and General Staff College publication of FC 100-20. It largely reinforced FM 100-20 but stated two significant changes in philosophy. It stated that regardless of the insurgency type or form a strategy of "resolving the insurgency with minimal assistance from US combat forces" is critical to success, and the "best cure for an insurgency is prevention."⁶⁰ Slowly, US Army doctrine was beginning to reflect the wisdom contained in the Small Wars Manual of 1940.

Current joint doctrine has enhanced the understanding of combating insurgencies, but also added a bit of confusion. It deals with insurgencies by type by classifying them as operations, not as concepts that need to be defined. For instance, Joint Publication 3-07.1 is for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), lists operational categories as insurgency, counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, peacekeeping, counterdrug, and contingency operations. Using Dr. Metz' definition of insurgency as the overarching concept, peacekeeping and contingency operations would not be insurgencies. However, insurgencies may be encountered in these environments.

Joint Pub 3-07.1 does not seem to recognize this since it classifies them as separate operations from insurgencies. Pub 3-07.1 does however provide a good doctrinal foundation for understanding and combating insurgencies. The document makes it clear that to understand a particular insurgency its own characteristics must be intensely studied. The old model of Mao's "people's war" is no longer the dominant form of insurgency; new "threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue."⁶¹ It is also clear that the principle mission of US forces is to assist the foreign government in its role as the principle combatant of a insurgency. All the elements of the DIME must be used citing unity of effort, and the military component is almost always only a supporting effort. It provides guidance like that contained in the Small Wars Manual for the training of US servicemen.

Standards of Conduct. It is extremely important that all US military personnel understand the importance of the image they project to the HN (host nation) population. They may offer the only impression of the United States the HN population will ever see. This impression may have lasting effects on the ability of the United States to gain long-term support for the overall FID program.⁶²

Integration of Special Operating Forces and all aspects of intelligence are also clearly important to successfully combating insurgencies. Special Forces have the unique skills and training to form the foundation for combating insurgencies along with the

essential integration of civil affairs and psychological operations units. Intelligence gathering, dissemination and continual updates designed to gage the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency programs are also stressed as critical components to the operation. All of these have proven effective in helping to combat insurgencies, whatever the type or form and regardless of the individual circumstances.

Reportedly the rewrite of FM 100-20 still emphasizes Mao's model for insurgencies, and if this is the case a great opportunity will have been missed, as the next version will require extensive revision. Unfortunately, in the interim US forces may continue to make the mistake of using an inappropriate model to analyze and combat an insurgency that simply does not fit. Additionally, the doctrine for appropriate models that is eventually developed will not be available to these forces when needed. The rewrite needs to make the necessary changes now.

US doctrine is deficient in its understanding of insurgencies that now exist as a result of the obsolescence of the old Mao's "people's war" model. It is evident that all insurgencies are different and must be analyzed, understood and combated on their own terms. Mao's "people's war" model is still a valid one, but one that is much less likely to be encountered by US forces. Joint and Army doctrine are basically sound in the general terms, but this doctrine does not provide sufficiently detailed guidance for US forces dealing with the broad range of insurgencies in today's world. Put differently, current doctrine is not sufficient for US forces faced with the requirement to shift almost instantaneously between operations and environments. More must be done to provide the doctrinal guidance that commanders and soldiers need. As an example of possible future forms of insurgencies it is only prudent to examine past experiences. The US Army's involvement in the American Civil War and Reconstruction is in fact an excellent example of a "new" form of insurgency that we may encounter in the future.

Southern Insurgency

Years after Appomattox, at a convention of Confederate veterans, that magnificent, simple cavalryman Nathan Bedford Forrest listened to a series of highflying speeches from his old comrades in arms, by way of apologia for the lost cause; but slavery was scarcely mentioned. Then Forrest rose up, disgruntled, and announced that if he hadn't thought he was fighting to keep his niggers, and other folks' niggers, he never would have gone to war in the first place.⁶³

One method to judge the effectiveness of an insurgency is simply to evaluate how long it took for it to achieve its goals. With respect to its goals, the Southern insurgency during Reconstruction was an unqualified success. By 1877 all the former Confederate states had been readmitted to the Union with full rights, the Southern US Congressmen and Senators wielded vastly disproportionate national political power in the US congress and the former slaves were effectively resubjugated and would remain so until the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In the 1986 monumental work, Why the South Lost the Civil War, the authors concluded:

It may seem to require amazing mental agility to conclude that the Confederacy had won victory. Yet if one takes as one Confederate goal the self-respect of a people, as another goal the preservation of the notion that Americans anywhere had a constitutional right to deal with their own people and institutions as they desired without outside interference, and, as a third, the desire to exercise the right in respect to their own black population, one has to only look at the century between the first and second Reconstructions. The South had indeed preserved its view of the Constitution, white supremacy, and honor.⁶⁴

The first Reconstruction Act was not passed by the US Congress until 2 March, 1867. By that time the Southern insurgency was already a fact. Therefore, the critical time for the formation of the insurgency was probably sometime before the end of the Civil War, when the South knew it would lose, and March 1867. During this intervening time period the only legally authorized force in the Southern states was local police forces (largely composed of and answering only to former Confederates) and the US Army. As an instrument of national power, the US Army was almost singularly responsible for the occupation of the Southern states during this time period following the Civil War and until

the implementation of the first Reconstruction Act. In his noted work, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877, James Sefton began his appraisal as such:

After hostilities ended, the Army administered Southern affairs without specific guidance from Washington, pending the formulation of a national policy. President Johnson soon announced a program of reconstruction, which the Army administered for six months. But Congress disagreed with the President, and the Army watched with apprehension as Congress inaugurated its struggle with Johnson over control of policy. The result was a period of fifteen months during which the Army, amidst great confusion, administered a policy no longer purely presidential but not yet clearly congressional.⁶⁵

In fact, this situation has proven to be the norm (not the exception) that the US Army has found itself in with post conflict operations and quite likely it will continue to be the norm. Thus, following the Civil War it was the US Army that was responsible for trying to interdict and subdue the insurgency of the Southern states.

To properly examine the Southern insurgency it is necessary to understand Southern society and determine the disaffection that gave rise to the insurgency. It is important to remember that the members of the Southern society are the only ones that have to have faith in what they believe to be true. For instance, if it was a commonly held belief that Southern society was noble and honest, then it is as good as fact until Southern society changes its collective mind. This is important because counterinsurgency measures must account for how *the receiver* views actions taken against it - not how the provider views the actions. Dr. Larry Cable, a noted expert on insurgency, explains that the credible capacity to coerce is defined by the recipients, and if the action is not credibly coercive, then it is most likely provocative.⁶⁶ So while the reader may disagree with the characterizations of Southern society, if that society believes them then they must be considered when formulating counterinsurgency plans.

US doctrine specifies that to understand an insurgency a detailed study of the society must be conducted; in Dr. Cable's words the "human terrain" must be mapped.⁶⁷ In the early stages of colonization the North and the South had much in common. Quickly, however, North and South began to evolve differently. While the northern states had

begun to industrialize by the 1840's, the southern states were locked into an agrarian economy. Cotton was the main cash crop and it required large quantities of cheap labor to make it profitable. By 1850's the northern states had generally outlawed slavery; principally for the practical reason that the economy did not require it. Cotton production was losing its financial attractiveness in the South until the invention of the cotton gin.⁶⁸ Before the Eli Whitney invented the cotton gin in 1793, "long staple" cotton was mainly grown in the South. However, "long staple" cotton was of a lesser quality than "short staple" cotton and resulted in less profit. With the invention of the cotton gin, "short staple" cotton became more profitable, and with it slavery.⁶⁹ The South therefore became a society dependent on agriculture for its prosperity and waged a protracted political struggle from the 1820's to 1861 to protect its position. With the election of Abraham Lincoln the South saw its economic prosperity threatened. The South considered the right to pursue its economic survival as a principle issue of "states rights."

By 1806, the dilemma of negro slavery began to creep into the foreground of national politics, and by 1824, John Randolph (a US Congressman from Virginia) demonstrated that the problem of slavery was linked inescapably with loose or strict construction of the Constitution, states rights, and internal improvements. From the latter year onward, therefore, the slavery controversy confuses and blurs any analysis of political principle in the South: the historian can hardly discern where, for instance, real love for states rights leaves off and interested pleading for slave-property commences.⁷⁰

In the view from the South, the Northern states would undermine its economic viability and trample states rights if it outlawed slavery. To help judge the magnitude of the economic consequences of slavery, when the Civil War ended and the blacks freed, Southern slave owners lost an estimated \$1 to \$4 billion dollars in "property."⁷¹

The South looked on the slave population as property; the North considered slavery immoral. Both the North and the South had built a mental model of slavery that was significantly different. Southerners built a mental model that for them answered their morally bankrupt position. They believed that any race that would allow itself to be subjugated probably deserved it and were therefore obviously an inferior race. Southern

society built its understanding of the black race on this belief and instituted safeguards (slave laws and local militia organizations) to protect white society from the slaves. Indications are that Southerners actually believed that to some extent it was their moral duty to continue to subjugate the black race since they were inferior and needed the strong hand of the white masters to provide for their welfare. Hodding Carter wrote in The Angry Scar, "On the one hand, the happy slave bows and scrapes, contented, loyal, and grateful, to his kindly master. On the other lurks a savage and persistent threat to the safety of the white man - and the white woman - in the South. The answer to the seeming contradiction, of course, is that the stereotype of devotion does not exclude the fearsome other."⁷² Otherwise, Southerners believed, the slaves would become utterly lawless and self-destructive.

The Northern population was in fact quite divided on the issue of slavery. Not that the general population was polarized, the majority were indifferent as compared to the then radical views of the abolitionists. The black population of the North was quite small. Those blacks that white Northerners did see were generally educated and more or less accepted members of society. The North did harbor prejudices of its own. In the state of Massachusetts until 1834 "every a black, mulatto, or Indian who came into the state and remained two months (was) to be whipped publicly", and repeated if they did not leave.⁷³ Still the most active voice was that of the abolitionists and the intellectual print media. For a short time before and after the Civil War there was a general cry among the Northern population for the forceful repudiation of slavery. Emigrants from Europe came to the industrial North "bringing with them memories of ancient serfdoms and a loathing for those who held men enslaved."⁷⁴ However, the public arousal did not last. These divergent views, those of the abolitionists/print media, and those of the general population, would, by 1877, cause the North to effectively abandon the former slaves following the end of Reconstruction.

Southern society was feudal in many ways. The majority of the economic and political power was held by a small portion of society who were large plantation slave holders. There existed a middle class, but it did not dominate society. The vast majority of the Southern white population was poor, and lived an existence of agrarian subsistence. This is significant, not because they did not own any slaves, but because they believed they were at least better than the slaves because the poor whites had citizens' rights.⁷⁵ Following the end of the war, these abject poor whites were in fact less than slaves. Their economic position was the same as the slaves, but they were disenfranchised, and they perceived that the Northerners were only concerned with the welfare of the former slaves and provided assistance only to them. As a result, the majority of Southerners, following the war, were immediately polarized against all aspects of the occupation and the former slaves the Yankees had freed and given franchise. This was fertile ground for an insurgency, a worst case scenario where the general population is predisposed to insurgency.

Historians have offered at least two additional possible explanations for the need to continue to resubjugate the former slaves besides the economic, political and racist. The first is founded in the religion of the South, the second in the perceived need of the white Southern male to protect the white Southern female. In Why the South Lost the Civil War, the authors admit that religions of the South and North were not distinctly different, but nevertheless because of the need to justify slavery, religion was used in combination with the concept of "cognitive dissonance" to justify it and the ensuing war.⁷⁶ They offer that cognitive dissonance "centers around the idea that if a person knows various things that are not psychologically consistent with one another, he will, in a variety of ways, try to make them more consistent."⁷⁷ The authors contend that the fundamentalist Christian religion told the Southerners that slavery was wrong, and that as it increasingly became clear the South would loose the Civil War the population determined it was "God's will" - because slavery was wrong. However, this does not explain why almost immediately following the

Civil War white Southerners began to resubjugate the former slaves. If slavery was wrong before and during the war, according to God's will, then why would white Southerners again subjugate the black population after the war if they considered slavery still wrong in God's eyes? The authors do not address this inconsistency. Their first assertion that Northern and Southern religious institutions were basically alike was more correct. Historians should recall that the breakup of the Christian religious churches into Northern and Southern denominations was a result of the Civil War and Reconstruction, not because of fundamental rifts prior to it.⁷⁸

The second possible explanation is the perceived need to protect the white Southern female. Psychologist and historian, Wyn Craig Wade, in The Fiery Cross, believed the Southern white woman had been "placed on a pedestal where she would be inaccessible to blacks and a guarantee of the purity of the white race," but that when treated in such a way they become "stones in bed."⁷⁹ Resulting in white slave owners taking black slave women as lovers. Emancipation placed the black male in a position to do to the white female as the white male had done to the black female, and this grew into a "morbid fear" for white males.⁸⁰ Whether or not this is a credible theory, one centered on interracial sex, it is safe to say that women in all parts of the United States during this time period were generally treated genteelly and with respect. This also ignores the fact that very few Southerners owned slaves. To carry the idea much further is questionable. The better explanations are simply the economic motive, politics and racist views of the country.

The need to maintain local militias was partially a response to the problem of runaway slaves and be prepared for local slave uprisings, but it was also needed since the South was still in many places a frontier. The South was sparsely populated compared to the North and as a result the South maintained a much more individualistic attitude among the population. One author describing the resultant phenomena summarized that these conditions resulted in the South as having as close to a warrior class as ever seen in the United States. "These were a people animated by a deadly exaggeration of what is required

of an honorable man, . . . the south loved all that was martial - her militia units, by the hundreds, . . . from Virginia to Texas; her military academies and institutes and colleges, so disproportionate to her other educational institutions and to those of the nation, and more proficient in teaching the manual of arms than the classics."⁸¹ So the men of the South went to war and returned beaten, but not broken, their warrior ways too ingrained to be fully expunged from them. They had fought a noble struggle and lost; they expected to be treated as honorable soldiers by their Yankee brothers in arms. But this was not to be, both the North and the South had unleashed a new kind of war, total war, that could not easily be terminated with the surrender at Appomattox.

In the conclusion of Robert E. Lee The Soldier, the early classic biography of the legendary general, Lee says farewell to the former Army of Northern Virginia.

As he rode along the lines, hundreds of his devoted veterans pressed around the noble chief, trying to take his hand, touch his person, or even lay a hand upon his horse, thus exhibiting for him their neat affection. The General then, with head bare and tears flowing freely down his manly cheeks, bade adieu to his army. In a few words he told the brave men who had been so true in arms to return to their homes and become worthy citizens.⁸²

Following the war Lee was conspicuous in his silence despite Southern calls for his leadership once more. His only interaction with the government was to ask for pardon from President Johnson. When it was denied he never asked again. But his last official words were to his soldiers for reconciliation. When Confederate President Davis met with Generals Johnston and Beauregard in North Carolina shortly before their surrender to General Sherman, Davis discussed the possibility of continued resistance with a guerrilla war. These professionals (formerly of the US Army) "argued emphatically the uselessness of continued resistance."⁸³ Fighting a conventional war was central to their understanding of being a soldier. "If they thought of it seriously, they would have perceived that leading guerrilla bands would fall outside of these ideals; and they would very likely have seen it as demeaning to their status."⁸⁴ Why then did the South resort to an insurgency? And what

did the US Army do that helped mitigate or encourage the onset of the Southern insurgency? First, what of the Ku Klux Klan?

The Ku Klux Klan is shrouded with the robe of Nazism in America. It is the embodiment of all that is evil to the vast majority of the American population and deservedly so. But for the purpose of this inquiry only the circumstances of its initial formation have considerable meaning. Actually, its formation had little impact on the development of the Southern insurgency. By the time the Ku Klux Klan became an instrument of terror in the South the insurgency had already begun, so it was a resultant phenomena of the insurgency rather than its origin. Additionally, there were numerous terrorist organizations across the South during Reconstruction that had no affiliation with the Klan. As for “that magnificent, simple cavalryman Nathan Bedford Forrest”, he was an afterthought to the original founders of the Klan; serving as a icon to further its agenda. While Forrest may have been arguably the best cavalryman that emerged during the war, he was no gentleman. Forrest was in fact an ardent racist that built his wealth on the importation and trade of slaves. He represents Hoffer’s “fanatic”, but one that, in the case of the Southern insurgency, was not involved in its formation, goals, or eventual success.

Sometime between Christmas 1865 and June 1866 the Klan was formed by six ex-Confederate soldiers in the town of Pulaski, Tennessee. They described themselves as simply bored with nothing to do. Perhaps even a bit of spirits enlivened their imaginations. In chronicling the history of the Klan one historian described their situation like this: “They realized there was utterly nothing to do. Governor Brownlow was keeping Tennessee under tight military control. Jobs were nonexistent, the townspeople were sullen, and the boredom was excruciating. John Lester (one of the original six) recalled, ‘The reaction which followed the excitement of army scenes and service was intense. There was nothing to relieve it.’”⁸⁵ This situation closely resembles the circumstances described by Hoffer. It was not until November 1866 that reports were being received of Klansmen beginning to terrorize Blacks in the Pulaski, Tennessee area. Tennessee already had similar terror

groups such as the "Yellow Jackets" and the "Redcaps of Tennessee", or other similar organizations across the South with such names as: the Knights of the White Camellia, the Pale Faces, and the Society of the White Rose.⁸⁶ The organization of groups like this were in fact not a new occurrence in the South.

The South, while a fairly homogeneous society, was incapable of generating a mass movement as evidenced in part by the failure of the Confederacy, yet the Klan and like organizations were widespread by the end of 1867. At the beginning of the War the Confederacy has made the conscious decision not to wage an unconventional one, "because, in large part, it did not seem possible to fight a guerrilla war and keep slavery intact."⁸⁷ Yet throughout the war organizations such as Mosby's Rangers and numerous others in Missouri and in all areas of the South behind Union lines, practiced guerrilla warfare. One historian referred to them this phenomena as "self-organized warfare" and to a large degree explains how these organizations arose in the South from 1865-1867.⁸⁸ This suggests that the Southern insurgency had a popular support base emanating from the general white population. Hoffer wrote, "Once the stage is set, the presence of an outstanding leader is indispensable. Without him there will be no mass movement."⁸⁹ Perhaps true in many cases, this was not true in the case of the Southern insurgency. Which again reinforces two contentions of this paper; that support for insurgency was widespread in the South but decentralized (analogous to the idea of "States Rights"), and that theoretically insurgencies are almost all different in form. The final thing that this suggests is that the destruction of these terrorist organizations was not key to the formation or resolution of the Southern insurgency; other root causes needed to be found and addressed before the insurgency could be beaten. Unfortunately, these root causes were almost impossible for the US Army to address.

Southern Insurgency Analyzed

"I can make the march, and make Georgia howl!"
In a letter to General U.S. Grant from
General William T. Sherman, October 9, 1864⁹⁰

Sympathetic Southern historians frequently call attention to the animosities left with the citizens that had to endure Sherman's march and Butler's occupation. Northern historians like to make a point of Confederate war crimes in the atrocities that were committed at places like Andersonville and by men like Forrest. Neither have meaning unless they caused a reaction within the mind of the public. Major Wirz paid the ultimate price for the suffering of the Federal prisoners under his charge at Andersonville. General Sherman was hailed as a hero. The South did not soon forget; states and counties did not ever forget. The Confederacy had failed as a nation. Its very precepts were built on each state as the true focus of political power. That President Davis forgot this was a contributing reason the Confederacy was defeated. To analyze the Southern insurgency it must be understood at the state and local levels. Many historians contend the Confederacy never developed a national identity and as a result never demonstrated the will to sustain the War as an independent nation state.⁹¹ The development of the Southern insurgency supports this claim.

Each state seemed to develop its own insurgency in response to the one unifying counterweight - the US Army. Other than the US Army there was only one other major counterweight - the Freedman's Bureau - but it was directed by an Army general with significant elements of the Bureau run by Army officers. Curiously, true Southern nationalism developed after the Civil War as a result of Reconstruction. The US Army and the US Government unified the South after the Confederate Government could not. This is a principle reason why this period in United States history is so valuable to the study of the development of insurgency and the conduct of post conflict operations. This section will focus on three elements of the relationship between the US Army and the rise of the Southern insurgency. These elements are: respect for human rights, maintenance of credible coercion verses provocation, and the US Army as an element of the DIME.

In the Autumn of 1995 General Barry McCaffery wrote an article on human rights adapted from an address presented to the School of Americas in 1994. In that article he

compared General Sherman's and General Lee's thoughts on how to conduct military operations in relation to the population. "Sherman observed; We are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies. If the . . . [civilians in the South] raise a howl against barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war, and not popularity seeking. If they want peace, they and their relatives must stop the war."⁹² Lee's words were offered in contrast: "No greater disgrace can befall the army and though it our whole people than the perpetration of barbarous outrages upon the innocent and defenseless. Such proceedings not only disgrace the perpetrators and all connected with them, but are subversive of the discipline and efficiency of the army, and destructive of the ends of our movement."⁹³ More instructive than these commanders' philosophies is the effect upon the soldiers and the civilian population.

In preparation for the Army of Northern Virginia's invasion of Pennsylvania for the Gettysburg campaign, General Lee issued General Orders No. 72 in which he detailed the manner property was to be confiscated. The order had two purposes; "prohibiting damage or destruction of private property and authorizing only certain officers to seize it."⁹⁴ By all accounts Lee's army stripped the country bare, but the reaction to his orders by the citizens of Pennsylvania had the desired effect. In the definitive work on the subject, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command, Edwin Coddington illustrated the effect of Lee's orders;

It was not the defiance of some people which impresses the Confederates so much as the more prevailing attitudes of submissiveness. Many Pennsylvanians had conjured up all sorts of horrible thoughts about the Confederates would do to them. When they found that the invaders did not burn their houses and barns, they willingly cooperated with the requests of polite officers to furnish food, horses, wagons, leather, saddles, and similar articles. Less humorous was the refusal of citizens to furnish Union commanders information about Confederate movements out of fear of enemy reprisals.⁹⁵

But these reprisals never occurred. In one case, after Union forces burned a bridge to delay the advancing Rebels, the fire spread to the nearby town. Confederate soldiers

“labored far into the night to put out the raging fire which threatened the whole community.”⁹⁶ Lee’s orders and the compliance of his officers and men accomplished his goals of providing supplies for the whole army and “to encourage the Northern peace movement by inducing respect for Southerners instead of hatred.”⁹⁷ Coddington admits that the last objective may not have been stated, “but if in the process of carrying it out the behavior of his men promoted a political end, so much the better.”⁹⁸ Sherman’s army was under much different orders and achieved a much different result.

General Sherman’s ideas about “total war” are well known. The effect on the officers and soldiers of the Army is well documented. Sherman initially issued orders similar to those of Lee, but the soldiers were not controlled and soon discipline broke down. Sherman and his officers controlled the movements of the army, but the rest was considered to be within the commander’s intent, and his intent was nothing less than the destruction of everything in the path of the army. One of Sherman’s aides, Major Hitchcock concluded “that he merely closed his eyes to the destruction”, and while brilliant in many soldierly ways “I am bound to say I think Sherman lacking in enforcing discipline.”⁹⁹ Sherman realized as much and knew that the destruction perpetrated by his army would have subsequent repercussions. He confided to his wife, in a letter home, “that he would be reviled in the south for years to come, and added: ‘I doubt of history affords a parallel to the deep and bitter enmity of the women of the South. No one who sees them and hears them but must feel the intensity of their hate.’”¹⁰⁰ Hoffer wrote of the danger women posed to the development of an insurgency, but considered them not touched by war, looking for a mass movement to supplant a lost husband. In the case of those women touched by Sherman’s army they faced the loss of husbands and felt war. As one historian summarized, “The women of the South seemed to be strongly anti-Yankee.”¹⁰¹

General McCaffery posed the following question when considering the actions of General Sherman: “Was his approach, making the “old and young, rich and poor, feel the

hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies" the most effective course of action."¹⁰² Of course General McCaffery was able to provide a ready answer.

Sherman's barbarity fueled a century of bitterness in the South, some of which endures to this day. Lee, of the other hand, espoused values that were not and are not a military weakness. Those values are a source of constant strength since they preclude an army dissipating its strength on wanton acts of destruction and do not create a requirement to defend gains because of enduring hostility from a civilian populace.¹⁰³

To counter the effects of what are essentially human rights abuses, General McCaffery states the two most important ingredients are simply good leadership and well trained and disciplined troops. Simple lessons, and ones that are contained in the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual and emphasized in Joint Publication 3.07.1. This first lesson may be simple but hard to realize without a constant concerted effort by officers and non-commissioned officers at all levels. Special emphasis should be placed on these lessons because even the most professional armies and units are not immune to the insidious effects of the failure to enforce them.

The second lesson is more difficult to identify and is not a normal consideration for commanders conducting combat operations. The Army must avoid ties with other organizations that are in direct contravention to beliefs of the general society. By doing so the Army maintains the ability to use credible coercion as a tool against the development of an insurgency. In March 1865 the US Congress created the Freedman's Bureau as an addition to the War Department. While the Freedman's Bureau in and of itself was not provocative, the administrators started and encouraged the formation of Loyal Leagues among the newly freed slaves. The purpose of the Loyal Leagues was decidedly political and even advocated violence against the whites of the South. The director of the Freedman's Bureau was General Oliver Otis Howard. By all accounts Howard was the wrong man for a very important job. Howard was one of Sherman's wing commanders on his march to the sea. He was from Maine, a West Point graduate, deeply religious and an abolitionist. In addition to Howard, US Army officers were appointed as assistant

commissioners of the 10 Bureau districts. While it is not known if the any of these officers participated in the formation and functions of the Loyal Leagues, the lesser civilian agents were certainly heavily involved.¹⁰⁴ The formation of the Loyal Leagues was widespread throughout the South and was immediately provocative to the white population. To the Southern white this was as bad as times could get; blacks were enfranchised (many of the whites were not), and they were becoming a significant voting arm and political tool of the Republican Party.

The Leagues were skillfully designed to remind the Negroes of their new importance and their obligations to the Republican party as the author of their freedom. The Loyal Leagues fanned the fires of racial discord. Their assemblies were characterized by denunciations of Southern whites. The Loyal Leagues in places organized military units and drilled along the highways; inevitably clashes between the armed Negroes and armed whites were frequent. Incendiary organizers and white League officials, often employees of the Freedmen's Bureau, encouraged Negro members to turn upon the Southern whites, so that the Loyal Leagues contributed more than any other Negro activity to the spread of the Ku Klux Klan.¹⁰⁵

In addition to the US Army's connection with the Freedman's Bureau, and further association with the Loyal Leagues, it was assigned the task to help the US Treasury Department confiscate all former Confederate government owned cotton. Corruption soon plagued the system because it was nearly impossible to determine government verses privately owned cotton and there were still vast amounts of money to be made in its resale.¹⁰⁶ Like the Loyal Leagues, there is little evidence that US Army personnel participated in the illegal activities associated with the trade of cotton, but they were perceived to be summarily guilty by association; the guarding of Treasury officials that participated in illegal activities.

Finally, the actual composition of the occupation force was in and of itself provocative to the Southern white population. In June 1865 there were over 200,000 soldiers occupying the South, by January 1866, only 87,550, by October 1866 the number was reduced to 17,679, and in October 1867 it had eased back up to 20,117. The total force numbers steadily declined from this point until 1877 when all Federal forces were

removed. The majority of these troops, from Fall 1865 to the Spring of 1866, were composed of black regiments.¹⁰⁷ Army records and official correspondence of the Union generals give a good account of the numbers of black soldiers and their impact. In August 1865, General Sheridan wrote to Secretary of War Stanton about the danger in the increase in proportion of black troops to white as a result of "mustering out."¹⁰⁸ It was not until November 1866 that the vast majority of black troops were removed from occupation duty. Still their very presence as the majority of occupation troops during this time period caused a provocative reaction among the white population. The leadership of the US Army however quickly recognized the effect the black soldiers were having and replaced them with white regiments, but not soon enough.

All these activities and the composition of the force were readily visible to the majority of the Southern white population. These activities could not be carried out without the backing of the US Army. The disenfranchised Southern white population could not stop these activities through the political system. Therefore they resorted to insurrection as a means to resubjugate blacks, rid the South of "carpetbaggers and scalawags", get control of their state governments again and end the occupation of the US Army. The force of the US Army was no longer credibly coercive; it was provocative.

The last lesson deals with the US Army as an element of the DIME. Current doctrine makes it clear that military power is almost always a lesser part of the equation in combating insurgencies; that diplomatic, informational and economic aspects are more often effective. Unfortunately, the US Army was the only appreciable aspect of the DIME that was used immediately after the end of the Civil War.

Diplomatically (or better referred to as politically in this case) the Southern governments were quickly reconstituted by the election of Union loyal Southerners. But, as elections were held it became clear that many elected officials were former Confederates. The generals in charge of the various military districts often found it necessary to nullify some elected persons or in some cases decertify whole elections. Judicial systems in the

South were often disbanded because they failed, in particular, to recognize the rights of blacks. The US Army often was called in to rectify these injustices over the protests of the white citizens. The combined effect of these actions by Southern legislatures and judges were in large measure the reasons the US Congress passed the first Reconstruction Act. The effect on white Southern society however was still the same - they saw these actions as provocative, as they were not able to order their society as they deemed necessary.

An admirable aspect of the Freedman's Bureau was that it provided an estimated 21,000,000 rations to destitute southern civilians, mostly between 1865 and 1867. About a quarter of these rations were issued to whites. Additionally, the Bureau provided \$5.2 million in funding for black public schools.¹⁰⁹ The unfortunate aspect of these good works was that it seldom benefited the society as a whole, particularly the majority of the white population. Granted, the population of the North was not feeling conciliatory towards the South and the idea of spending money rebuilding a Southern society that had caused such devastation and loss of life was contradictory. However, by granting significant material, economic, and informational concessions to blacks and not to the equally needy whites these actions were again seen as provocative. Other than these actions to help the blacks (and some needy whites) the US Government offered few positive economic incentives to entice Southern states to rejoin the Union peacefully.

Informationally it appears that the US Army was relatively neutral. While officers did from time to time find certain Southern newspapers offensive and forbade their publication, there did not seem to be any attempt to use information systems to their advantage. Thus the US Army surrendered the initiative in this area to the Southern insurgents.

What could the US Army have done differently? Probably not much. Grant and Sherman developed a strategy of total war that brought the Confederacy to its knees. The lasting effect of this strategy would have many repercussions in the South and on how the US Army would pursue victory in many future conflicts. Northern society, and

particularly the politicians, were not interested in welcoming the rebellious states back into the Union on the terms that Lincoln and Johnson were willing to give. They wanted retribution for what they perceived as dangerous and immoral acts committed by a whole society that must now pay for their treason. The collective mind seemed to say that the US Army had won the war and would now supervise the "reconstruction" (meaning reordering) of Southern society. In truth they meant their actions to be provocative, and the South would have to accept Northern rule. The South did not see it in such terms - they would carry-on the rebellion with an insurgency. The South won the insurgency and inadvertently the North doomed the black population of the United States to resubjugation for another 100 years.

Conclusion

"One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement."¹¹⁰ Sun-Tzu, 512 B.C.

Nuclear war may not be the ultimate means in which to wage war - you can not change a human mind with a nuclear bomb. Insurgency is as old a category of war as any other, and in an insurgency the *raison d'être* is to change peoples minds. The types of insurgencies may be more easily recognized than the forms. The United States Army has had as one of its principle beliefs that over the last 40 years insurgency is of one type and form - Mao's "people's war". This is a dangerous belief, as it leads to doctrine and ultimately a strategy that will most likely not work against other types and forms of insurgencies that we now know exist. The US Army, and the uniform services in the more general sense, need to study and develop doctrine to provide commanders and soldiers with guidance that is lacking currently.

The works of Hoffer and Brinton are good starting points to develop an understanding of the theoretical foundation for the development of insurgencies. Both works were written before the paradigm of Mao's "people's war" was in vogue, and provide a solid base for analysis. Fortunately, there are insurgency experts like Drs. Metz

and Cable that have also recognized the problem and are working to develop a more current doctrine and general understanding of the complexity of insurgency development and counterinsurgency techniques.

Current US Army and Joint doctrine do have value. Recently this doctrine has begun to recognize the complexity of insurgency. The Cold War provided the United States with an identifiable enemy in communism, and communists stated support for “wars of national liberation” helped solidify that position. We no longer can operate in this well defined world; it is simply gone. The doctrine developed to deal with Mao’s “people’s war” was sound, and this doctrine may be useful in the future. But the principles of complexity and coevolution lead us to the conclusion that our doctrine must continue to evolve to deal with new threats. Insurgency is time immortal and many examples are available for examination in the quest to develop appropriate doctrine.

The most fundamental problems however, still remain. For instance: what is the definition of insurgency? Is insurgency a separate category of warfare or is it all encompassing to those types of warfare short of conventional war and more than simple criminal acts? This paper concludes that the definition of insurgency should take something like Dr. Metz’s definition - “simply protracted, organized violence”. This will provide a theoretical framework for classifying the types of insurgencies in a way like that shown below.




Figure 1: Types of Insurgencies

Revolutionary war and organized criminal activity are not as clear as types of insurgencies like that commonly accepted for Guerrilla war and terrorism, but can be included as they often signal the emergence from or entry into insurgency. This is not meant to portray insurgency on a continuum, although many times this does occur. An agreed upon definition of insurgency is critical to begin to understand it. The forms of insurgency are even more difficult to understand and identify, and largely give each one its distinguishing characteristics. Understanding the form of a particular insurgency can be particularly confounding when it manifests a combination of political, religious, ethnic, racial, cultural and criminal causes. These combinations are difficult to classify and understand, but a critical first step in combating an insurgency - mapping the "human terrain."

The Southern insurgency following the Civil War provides some unique lessons that are still valuable in combating insurgencies. The society that the US Army must interact with must be understood in great detail: the "human terrain" must be mapped. Commanders and soldiers alike must understand the people they will encounter. They must be well disciplined, trained and led. They must respect human rights. Constant scrutiny of counterinsurgency measures and the effect on the society must be evaluated for them to be effective. One key principle is that counterinsurgency measures must be credibly coercive and not provocative. Consideration of all aspects of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic aspects of power must be brought to bear in the right combinations to successfully combat insurgencies. And lastly, the US Army must understand that its very presence may change the complexion of the insurgency.

The American Civil War and its aftermath, Reconstruction, are good examples of complex situations where an insurgency should not have developed but did. Its consequences were so great that the results continue to reverberate in American society today. The failure of the US Army to preclude the rise of the Southern insurgency is singularly instructive to understanding our political system, and particularly Southern society even to this day. The most tragic result of Reconstruction was the continued

subjugation of the American black population at least until 1964 and many would argue even to this day. The US Army must continue to examine past insurgencies so it can be ready to combat the insurgency that could be starting even today.

ENDNOTES

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76. Beringer, Hattaway, Jones, and Still, p. 280-281.
77. Ibid., p.281.
78. Carter, p. 77-89. Carter describes the fundamental rift of the Southern and Northern Methodist, Presbyterian and Baptist churches before the war. This fundamental rift was on the issue of slavery. However, once areas of the South were occupied early in the war Secretary of War Stanton gave US Army Generals permission to confiscate Southern

church property and give it to the like sect Northern church. When President Lincoln learned of this he ordered Stanton to stop - Stanton only modified his orders. During Reconstruction the Southern churches eventually were able to get some property returned, but some of it was turned over to the newly formed African Methodist Episcopal Church. These events during and after the Civil War caused the formation of distinct Southern and Northern congregations that still endure today.

79. Wyn C. Wade, The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America, (London: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 20.

80. Ibid., p. 21.

81. Carter, p. 198-199.

82. Sir Frederick Maurice, Major General, Robert E. Lee The Soldier, (New York: Bonanza Books, 1925), p. 293.

83. Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991), p. 676.

84. Ibid., p. 676.

85. Wade, p.32-33.

86. Wade, p.37, and Carter p. 216.

87. Reid Mitchell, "The Perseverance of Soldiers" in Why the Confederacy Lost, Gabor S. Boritt, Ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 125.

88. Ibid., p. 124.

89. Hoffer, p. 104.

90. Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union military policy toward Southern civilians, 1861-1865, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 190.

91. Beringer, Hattaway, Jones, and Still, p. 439. The idea that the Confederacy lacked national will is the thesis of this work.

92. Barry R. McCaffery, General, USA, "Human Rights and the Commander." Joint Forces Quarterly. Autumn 1995/ Number 9, p. 11.

93. Ibid., p.11.

94. Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study In Command, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 154.

95. Ibid. p.157-158.

96. Ibid., p.158-159.

97. Ibid., p.155.

98. Ibid., p.155.

99. Burke Davis, Sherman's March, (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 37.
100. Ibid., p. 37.
101. Sefton, p. 54.
102. McCaffery, p. 11.
103. Ibid., p.11.
104. Carter, p.59.
105. Ibid., p.60-61.
106. Sefton, p.38-39.
107. Ibid., Summarized from tables in Appendix B., p. 260-262.
108. Ibid. p. 51.
109. 5.2 B Freedman's Bureau
110. Sun Tzu, Ralph D. Sawyer, Translator, The Art of War, (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), p.179.

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